Foreword: On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, and Original Intent by Lehrman, Lewis E.
FRAMERS' INTENT: AN
EXCHANGE
On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall,
and Original Intent
A Foreword by
Lewis E. Lehrman*
If it should be said that Abraham Lincoln was one of the
framers of the post-Civil War Constitution, then it may also be
said that Professor Harry V. Jaffa is Lincoln's John Marshall.
For in Jaffa's evangelization of Lincoln one discovers not the
temperament of a lawyer but of a lawgiver, not the profession
of a judge, but a prophet of first principles of jurisprudence.
One need not agree with Jaffa, the philosopher and apologist
of Lincoln, to declare him indispensable to the American
republic. Indeed, if Harry Jaffa did not exist, I would want to
invent him, if only to recover for Conservatives the first princi-
ples of the American Founding-the true meaning of the Dec-
laration of Independence. This I would do because the future
of the world depends in no small measure upon the future of
America-and, therefore, upon American constitutional
principles.
In the ongoing debate over the authentic Constitution,
consider only several unresolved but fundamental issues: Are
the legal positivists and legal realists, heirs of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Charles Evans Hughes, right when
they declare constitutional law to be whatever the highest leg-
islators or Supreme Court Justices say it to be? And is it then
unappealable, even if such "law" plainly violates the funda-
mental law by which the nation was founded? Moreover, is
the original intent, the meaning of the Framers, undiscover-
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able in the four corners of the Constitution itself, or in its his-
tory? And further, are these considerations irrelevant, as the"non-interpretists" imply, when finding and applying the fun-
damental law of the land?
On the other hand, and above all, are Jefferson, Madison,
Washington, Adams, and Lincoln right when, according to "the
laws of nature and of nature's God," they "hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator" with the unalienable rights to life,
to liberty, and to the pursuit of happiness? And do the Fram-
ers thus not correctly hold that any legislation or judgment of
a court fundamentally in violation of these unalienable rights
is by its nature, obnoxious to the Constitution? Is it not obnox-
ious because according to the very words of the Declaration of
Independence, "to secure these rights,' governments are insti-
tuted among men," so "that whenever any form of government
becomes destructive of these ends [namely, securing the
unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness]
it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute
new government. . . ." It is true that in the Constitution of
1787 a number of guarantees were provided to the institution
of chattel slavery, as it had grown up and become deeply
rooted before independence, when the Crown forbade the colo-
nists to interfere with the importation of slaves from Africa.
And chattel slavery, considered in itself, was assuredly a com-
plete violation of the right to liberty of each person. But the
Framers of the Constitution acted, in Lincoln's words, on the
maxim that it is better to "consent to any great evil, to avoid a
greater one."2 The more perfect Union of 1787 could not have
been formed without the concessions to slavery: but the Union
thus formed was committed more strongly than heretofore to
the ultimate extinction of slavery. Only the stronger Union,
created by the Constitution of 1787, was strong enough to
oppose the expansion of slavery and meet the crisis of the
Union in 1861. Thus, by Lincoln's statesmanship-by his
unswerving commitment to the principles of the Declaration of
Independence, as the principles of the Constitution-was the
prudential wisdom of the Framers vindicated, and slavery itself
destroyed. The "just powers of government" are thus, in the
long run, derived not only from the consent of the governed,
1. Emphasis added.
2. R. BASLER, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIs SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 308-09 (1946).
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but from that consent which is consciously directed to securing
the natural rights with which all men are endowed by their
Creator.
The principles laid down at the birth of the republic on
July 4, 1776, are manifestly what the Framers meant to imple-
ment, since Madison himself, the Father of the Constitution,
held that the Declaration was "the fundamental act of union ' 3
of the States. That is to say, it was the first lawful instrument
by which to illuminate the constitutional principles of the
American union. The implications of the fundamental law of
the union are too often ignored by constitutional scholars who,
nevertheless, cannot deny that the Declaration is placed at the
head of the statutes at large of the United States Code, and is
described therein as one of the "organic" laws of the United
States. Therefore, I would argue that, just as the fourteenth
amendment may have incorporated certain of the first ten
amendments into the state constitutions, so too has the original
intent of the Founders and the United States Code incorpo-
rated the Declaration of Independence into the Constitution of
the United States.
The durable issue of our age, with great consequences for
future generations, is the current debate over how to interpret
the American Constitution. The issue is now joined also
within the Conservative movement. Shall the meaning of the
Constitution itself-the original intent of the Framers of the
Constitution-as revealed in the document and in its history,
prevail in the Supreme Court? Or, is this intent, the meaning
of the Framers, too imprecise and thus unknowable, leading
inevitably to the conclusion of the legal positivists that the law
can only be what the judges and legislators say it is; or more
plausibly yet, what the "sovereign" people vote it to be-no
matter if judges, legislators, and even the people decide and
vote, say, for slavery or legislated murder? From such an out-
come, is there no appeal under the Constitution? In this strug-
gle between the natural law (the Declaration of Independence)
and legal positivism (judge-made law), Americans will soon
have to choose-in Presidential and Congressional elections.
There is no more important choice before us as a people.
Professor Jaffa makes his case in his following essay well
enough without help from me. He is one of the most persua-
sive advocates of what Professor Edward S. Corwin called the
3. IX THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 219-221 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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"higher law" doctrine of the Constitution; namely, that the
first principles of the American regime, according to which the
positive law of the Constitution must be interpreted in ambigu-
ous cases, are codified in the natural law doctrine of the Decla-
ration of Independence, the Magna Carta of the Founding.
Jaffa's view, however, is a minority view, confronting as it does
a prevailing and contrary consensus in the Supreme Court and
among legislators and law schools. The consensus may best be
summed up in the words of my friend Professor Benno
Schmidt, former Dean of Columbia Law School and now Presi-
dent of Yale, who in discussing this issue with me said, "Amer-
ican constitutional law is positive law, and the Declaration of
Independence has no standing in constitutional interpretation
whatsoever."
There are two main schools of constitutional theories.
But, ironically, both legal philosophies are ways by which to
decide constitutional intent by reference to authorities outside
the four corners of the Constitution. Attorney General Meese,
in his Dickinson College speech (quoted at length in Appendix
A herein) agrees with Jaffa (not to mention Jefferson,
Madison, Marshall, and Lincoln!) that "there exists in the
nature of things a natural standard for judging whether gov-
ernments are legitimate or not."4 That extrinsic authority-the
standard of the Constitution-one finds in the Declaration of
Independence. In the other case, as with Professor Schmidt or
Justice Harry Blackmun,5 the extrinsic authority one can find
in the supervening extra-constitutional opinion of the Supreme
Court Justice.
But while Jaffa does not explicitly consider it, and the
Supreme Court today all but ignores it, there is another
authoritative way to discover original intent, as Professor
Christopher Wolfe shows in his book The Rise of Modern Judi-
cial Review.6 That way was the work of Chief Justice John
Marshall, whose authority has been claimed not only by tradi-
tionalists, who hold that the Supreme Court Justice must
always find the meaning of the law in the original intent of the
Framers, but also by judicial supremacists who hold that the
judge must and should legislate himself. But let us hear Chief
Justice Marshall himself on the issue: "[J]udicial power is
4. E. Meese, Speech at Dickinson College (Sept. 17, 1985).
5. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW (1985).
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never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
the law"7 made by the legislator. And further, "we [judges]
must never forget that it is a Constitution we are
expounding,"' not the legislative opinions of judges. And in
Marbury v. Madison he declares, "[i]t is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." 9 But (from McCullough v. Maryland) he emphasizes that"where the law is not prohibitive," for judges "to undertake
here to inquire into the degree of [the law's] necessity would
be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department
and to tread on legislative ground."'10 Moreover, Marshall's
legal reasoning and opinion show that the original intent of the
Framers and of the Constitution can generally be discovered
intrinsically, that is, by analysis of the full text of the docu-
ment itself-by carefully applying rational rules of legal con-
struction that depend primarily upon the plain meaning of the
words themselves, the full context of the words, the subject
matter with which the words of the law deal, and the obvious
spirit or cause that gave rise to the law. That the law itself
must do justice in all cases, whatever the rule of construction,
is Marshall's first principle of jurisprudence. This he makes
clear in Marbury v. Madison by asking the simple question:
"[C]an it be imagined that the law furnishes to the injured
party no remedy?":" To this Marshall rejoins, "[i]t is not
believed that any person whatever would attempt to maintain
such a proposition."' 2 Moreover, these principles of natural
justice, argued Marshall in Ogden v. Saunders, were the very
principles of "the [F]ramers of our Constitution" who "were
intimately acquainted with the writings of those wise and
learned men, whose treatises on the laws of nature and nations
have guided public opinion ... .""- The meaning of the phrase"obligation of contracts" in the Constitution, Marshall
declared, was that of "an original intrinsic obligation."' 4 In
this case Marshall plainly affirms that the meaning of the Con-
7. Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
8. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 207 (1819).
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1802).
10. McCullough, 17 U.S. at 200.
11. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165.
12. Id
13. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 213 (1827).
14. Id
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stitution is to be found in its incorporation of the natural law
into the positive law. "We must suppose that the [F]ramers of
our Constitution took the same view of the subject [viz., as the
"wise and learned men" who wrote the "treatises on the laws
of nature"] Marshall concluded, "and the language they have
used confirms this opinion ... ."" In short, the judge cannot
know in such a case what the positive law of the Constitution
is unless he knows what the natural law is.
Thus Marshall found it simple, if painstaking, to decide
whether a law, or act, or judicial decision was unconstitutional;
and he enshrined his reasoning in the Marbury decision, one of
the most important judicial opinions of Supreme Court history.
In this opinion, often cited by both judicial supremacists and
legal positivists who reject natural law, Marshall considers
"the question, whether an act, repugnant to the Constitution,
can become the law of the land. It seems only necessary to rec-
ognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well
established, to decide it."' 6 And by what principle shall it be
decided? To which Marshall had an unequivocal answer:
"That the people have an original right to establish, for their
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall
most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the
whole American fabric is erected." "The principles, therefore,
so established, are deemed fundamental."'" But why or how is
Marshall so absolutely sure of "the basis" and "the principles"
deemed fundamental to the Constitution-to the "whole
American fabric?" Because, in fact, Marshall draws the very
words of this part of his opinion almost exactly from the Dec-
laration of Independence itself-from the second paragraph,
which reads "it is the right of the people ... to institute new
government laying its foundation on such principles . . .as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness.""8
Thus the basis of the American Republic is found by Mar-
shall in the Declaration of Independence. But, echoing Mar-
shall, one must then ask: can it be supposed that the
Declaration, the fundamental act of union, which provides the
basis, the original right of the people to establish fundamental
15. Id
16. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. The Declaration of Independence 2 (U.S. 1776).
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principles of government-can it truly be supposed that this
great charter of American liberties is to be ignored by
Supreme Court Justices, members of Congress, Presidents,
Attorneys General, and law school professors-to be set aside
in favor of judicial supremacy, narrow positivist doctrine and"result oriented" jurisprudence, whether of the Right or of the
Left? Shall it truly be supposed that both legal positivists and
judicial supremacists, even advocates of original and strict con-
struction, all of whom cite Marshall, may properly abandon the
Declaration of Independence as the source of those fundamen-
tal rights and principles by which the inevitable ambiguities of
constitutional interpretation should be decided-when Chief
Justice Marshall himself finds that "the[se] principles . . . are
deemed fundamental,' 9 because they stem from the
Declaration?
Surely, "[i]t is not believed that any person whatever
would attempt to maintain such a proposition. '20
Thus, too, does Harry Jaffa hold for the Declaration.
And so, for his love of truth, for his luminous intellect, for
the light of the world he shines on the philosophy of law, we
read and honor Harry Jaffa.
19. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
20. Id. at 165.
